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I. INTRODUCTION 
Once again, the United States Supreme Court has passed on a ripe 
opportunity to facilitate Congress’s intent to protect the integrity of our 
public securities markets under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“1934 Act”) and instead has chosen to frustrate both sound policy and 
statutory language with feeble legal analysis in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.1  In holding in favor of 
defendants who actively aided and participated in inflating revenues and 
hiding costs used to prepare public financial statements,2 the Court 
continued its more than two-decade-old hostility towards our system of 
protecting the integrity of securities markets with private causes of action 
for fraud.3  Stoneridge continues the pattern in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.4 
and Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver5 of 
insulating culpable parties from private action liability when they did not 
directly participate in the sale of securities.6  In Stoneridge, the Supreme 
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 1. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 2. Id. at 766–67. 
 3. Cf. id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A theme that underlies the Court’s analysis is its 
mistaken hostility towards the § 10(b) private cause of action.”). 
 4. 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 5. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 6. See Stuart Sinai, Stoneridge—Escape From Securities Liability Notwithstanding Active, 
Intentional, Deceptive Conduct, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 170, 187 (2008).  Mr. Sinai fairly concludes: 
 Under Stoneridge, a professional can rest easy so long as the attorney, CPA, and 
investment banker make no statements to the public.  It appears no matter their 
culpability, they will escape private civil liability under § 10(b).  As mere “aiders and 
abettors,” Stoneridge excludes them from coverage under § 10(b) and the Rule.  The 
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Court went even further than it had before and found that corporations 
who knowingly and actively participated in a scheme to create phony 
revenue and fool the auditors certifying publicly filed financial 
statements are beyond the reach of federal securities laws.7  The 
reasoning underlying such a bizarre conclusion was that the fraud was 
consummated in the market for goods and services rather than the 
securities market.8 
Hence, I ask the question in the title: what will it take to label such 
conduct as participation in a deceptive scheme to defraud buyers or 
sellers of securities?  With this Court, it is clear that no unethical conduct 
by corporations assisting securities fraud will be actionable by the 
victims as long as the corporation avoids direct communication with the 
victims.9  As part of the solution to the drastic loss of confidence in U.S. 
markets which we are experiencing now,10 the President and Congress 
must expressly direct the Court, through legislation, to allow private 
actions against secondary participants.  Again, what will it take to wake 
up those who are steering the economy and the legal system? 
Perhaps the answer to the question posed by this paper is: n(Bernie 
Madoffs).  I do not know the value of n, but surely there exists a number 
of fifty-billion-dollar-Ponzi-schemes which will motivate the President 
and Congress to intervene and provide the leadership the Supreme Court 
has failed to provide in protecting the integrity of our financial markets. 
I argue that the Court decided Stoneridge incorrectly because the 
majority over-simplified the concepts of causation, reliance, and duty.  I 
also argue that the unintended consequence of the Court’s decision will 
be to drive controversies over securities fraud into state courts where 
they can be litigated as a breach of fiduciary duty under what is generally 
more expansive corporate law rather than litigating these cases under our 
                                                                                                                       
lawyer that works, plans and schemes with his client to deceive and defraud the investing 
public, but who is careful to make no public statements, is free of civil liability under the 
Eighth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s current view as expressed in Stoneridge. 
Id. 
 7. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774. 
 8. Id. (“Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in the marketplace for goods 
and services, not in the investment sphere.”). 
 9. Cf. Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 
AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 683 (2008) (“The . . . holding that collateral parties who knowingly participate in 
fraudulent schemes are merely ‘secondary’ parties who cannot be held liable is utterly inconsistent 
with every relevant body of fraud law in existence in 1934.”). 
 10. As of March 2, 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had lost fifty-five percent of its 
highest value of 2007.  Neil Irwin, In Free-Fall, Stocks Hit Lowest Mark Since ‘97, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 3, 2009, at A1.  All current economic indicators are down and all forecasts are for a long 
recession.  Recent legislation for more than a trillion dollars in government stimulus spending to 
help support the economy is further evidence of unprecedented turmoil. 
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ever-shrinking national securities legal protection.11  This result will also 
lead to the undesirable situation of more uneven treatment of securities in 
the national market based on state of incorporation with major variations 
in the outcomes resulting from variations in the laws, the benches, and 
the workloads of fifty-one different jurisdictions.12  Finally, I further use 
economic theory to argue that the time is ripe for legislative action with 
executive leadership to impose civil liability in private actions for aiding 
and abetting violations of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  Quick action is 
especially justified in the multiple wakes of the weak economy, crises in 
the financial sector, loss of confidence in U.S. markets, and the possible 
elimination of Sarbanes-Oxley.13  These forces are merging together into 
                                                     
 11. See Mark Klock, Lighthouse or Hidden Reef? Navigating the Fiduciary Duty of Delaware 
Corporations’ Directors in the Wake of Malone, 6 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 45 (2001) [hereinafter 
Klock, Fiduciary Duty] (“Given the procedural restrictions Congress has erected for private actions 
under the federal securities laws, and given the barriers the federal courts have erected in obtaining 
judgments against aiders and abettors, the interaction between federal securities laws and state laws 
pertaining to corporate governance has taken on increased importance.  In creating the Delaware 
carve-out provisions of the Uniform Standards Act, Congress explicitly provided plaintiffs with an 
alternative forum with different procedural and substantive law to litigate federal securities 
violations when those violations also constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.  The corporate law of 
Delaware, now more than anytime in the previous sixty-five years, will have a prominent role in 
protecting the integrity of the marketplace.”). 
 12. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in 
the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495 (2003).  Professor Karmel writes: 
[M]uch state securities regulation over the years has been duplicative, unnecessarily 
burdensome, and expensive for the securities industry, without adding sufficient value in 
terms of investor protection.  Also, state securities regulation is uneven from state to state 
and even from administration to administration within a particular state.  Further, 
regulatory competition between national regulators frequently is an unseemly 
jurisdictional battle fueled by politics.  Moreover, such competition can lead to disrespect 
for the law, as one regulator undermines the laws and regulations of another regulator. 
   . . . The reason securities regulation became a matter of federal concern is that there 
was a need to increase investor confidence in order to generate capital formation in the 
1930s.  There was also a need to assure against systemic collapses caused by excessive 
stock market speculation leading to the bursting of the stock market bubble in 1929 and 
the bankruptcy of numerous financial institutions.  State securities regulation and SRO 
regulation had proved inadequate in performing this task, which was national in scope. 
Id. at 544–45 (footnotes omitted). 
 13. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Lawsuit Threatens Sarbanes-Oxley Act, WASH. POST, July 20, 
2008, at F1 (“Just when you thought that the drive toward better financial accounting couldn’t be 
stopped, a stick may be shoved into the spokes.  A decision expected soon from a federal court might 
throw the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into limbo . . . because the law lacks a ‘severability’ clause.  If one of 
its provisions is found to be unconstitutional, the whole law goes down. . . .  [I]f the court does strike 
down [Sarbanes-Oxley], it couldn’t come at a worse time for investors.  The financial crisis linked to 
subprime loans left the valuation of trillions of dollars of securities in doubt.  Nothing is more 
important to the functioning of markets than pulling reliable numbers out of this morass.”).  The case 
referred to later ruled Sarbanes-Oxley to be constitutional, but in a split decision.  Free Enter. Fund 
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  Not surprisingly, the 
case has been appealed and could be overturned.  The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case during 
the upcoming term.  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 129 S. Ct. 2378, 2378 
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a powerful storm surge overwhelming our formerly deep and liquid 
securities markets that developed over several decades of nurturing. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE SECURITIES REGULATION LAW ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Outrageous Deception in Stoneridge 
The facts of Stoneridge involve egregious participation in a 
fraudulent scheme by three corporations: Charter Communications, 
Scientific-Atlanta, and Motorola.14  Stoneridge Investment Partners 
purchased stock of Charter Communications, a cable company.15  In 
order to falsely inflate corporate revenue, Charter entered into sham 
contracts with Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola that enabled Charter to 
claim it had met its projected revenue.16  In addition to signing the 
contracts, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola assisted Charter in fooling its 
auditor by drafting documents to make the transactions appear unrelated 
and part of the ordinary course of business, and by backdating some of 
the contracts to further create the appearance of being unrelated.17  The 
Court explains the details of the specific action engaged in by Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola as follows: 
 Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set 
top) boxes that Charter furnished to its customers.  Charter arranged to 
overpay respondents $20 for each set top box it purchased until the end 
of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return the 
overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter.  The 
transactions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because 
Charter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and 
capitalize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally 
accepted accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter 
to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met 
projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers.  Respondents 
agreed to the arrangement.18 
In other words, the sham transaction would create artificial revenue on 
the books for the current fiscal year without fully offsetting costs because 
the accompanying costs (overpayments) would be amortized over several 
                                                                                                                       
(2009). 
 14. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 766–67. 
 17. Id. at 767. 
 18. Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
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years.19  The sham transactions created phony revenue of $17 million for 
the year.20  As markets capitalize these revenues, this would be 
equivalent to creating more than $200 million in equity value by fraud.21 
As Professor Robert Prentice describes these facts, Stoneridge is a 
simple case of A participating in a scheme to aid B in defrauding C.22  In 
this case, B—Charter—ultimately failed and the defrauded investor 
sought to recover from the As—Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.  The 
transaction is not materially different from a situation in which a co-
conspirator helps to deceive a home appraiser and assists a “buyer” in 
obtaining funds fraudulently by appraising a worthless outhouse as a 
$400,000 home for which a lender loans $380,000 that the “buyer” 
transfers to a close relative who is selling the property.23  The “buyer” 
then defaults and vanishes (as does the seller) and the lender’s only asset 
is the remaining worthless collateral.24 
Such an analogy shows the deceptive nature of the conduct at issue.  
Yet, to summarize the opinion, which will be analyzed in more detail 
infra, the Court found that the facts showed the respondents at most 
aided and abetted a violation of § 10(b).25  This holding then opened the 
door for an eager Court to make the ruling it strongly desired—that there 
continues to be no private cause of action for aiding and abetting even 
though Congress expressly brought back aiding and abetting liability in 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions in the  
 
                                                     
 19. See generally SHYAM SUNDER, THEORY OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL 65–79 (1997) 
(discussing problems and conflicts underlying the measurement of income); Mark Klock, Two 
Possible Answers to the Enron Experience: Will It Be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of 
Secondary Liability?, 28 J. CORP. L. 69, 94–100 (2003) [hereinafter Klock, Fortune Tellers] 
(explaining the difficulty of estimating earnings and income when costs must be allocated over 
different time periods). 
 20. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. 
 21. Annual earnings of $17 million with no future growth capitalized at 8.5 percent would be 
valued at $200 million in the financial market.  This rate was a reasonable capitalization rate in 2000 
when the fraud occurred.  Market expectations for growth in earnings would add substantially to this 
valuation.  See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
138–39 (3d ed. 2006) (explaining the valuation of corporate earnings using a capitalization rate 
methodology). 
 22. Prentice, supra note 9, at 613. 
 23. Cf. id. (describing hypothetical where Sam misrepresents Joe’s assets and credit worthiness 
to Mary to enable Joe to purchase stock on credit from Mary). 
 24. Cf. FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK REGULATORY POLICY AND PROGRAMS 
DIVISION, MORTAGAGE LOAN FRAUD: AN INDUSTRY ASSESSMENT BASED UPON SUSPICIOUS 
ACTIVITY REPORT ANALYSIS 14–15 (2006), http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/reports 
/pdf/MortgageLoanFraud112006.pdf (reporting more than 2.5 percent of mortgage fraud involving 
the use of straw buyers). 
 25. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771. 
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wake of outrage over the Court’s initial blanket elimination of the well-
established doctrine of aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank.26 
I, like many other securities law commentators and at least three 
Supreme Court Justices,27 believe that the Court construed the law too 
narrowly and that the defendants should have been liable as either 
primary participants in a scheme to defraud buyers of securities or 
through a theory of secondary liability.  I also believe that the law must 
incorporate secondary liability in private actions before confidence in the 
market can be fully restored to the high levels that brought economic 
prosperity in the past.28  Senator Carl Levin recently stated: 
 In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court determined that shareholders are 
barred by federal law from suing third parties that help public 
companies commit fraud, and must instead rely on federal regulators to 
punish wrongdoing and recover funds.  Given limited federal resources, 
however, that ruling means, in too many cases, banks, accounting 
firms, lawyers and others will be able to aid and abet corporate fraud, 
and shareholders will have no legal recourse.  That isn’t fair, and it 
undermines investor confidence in U.S. markets.29 
But to fully understand the impact of the Stoneridge decision, it is 
helpful to examine the rise and fall of the doctrine of secondary liability 
within the federal securities laws. 
B. Pre-Stoneridge Securities Laws: A Brief History 
Secondary liability in the context of the federal securities laws arises 
in conjunction with a primary violation when an additional party which 
is not primarily liable (perhaps because that party did not sell securities) 
renders assistance to the primary violator.30  “Secondary liability is an 
issue normally present whenever there is a violation of the federal 
                                                     
 26. See id. at 777–78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 27. See id. at 781–82. 
 28. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 109 (“The vehicle for attaining full and fair 
disclosure is attachment of civil liability for anything less, and given the vital role . . . in protecting 
the integrity of the market, statutes should be amended to expressly provide for aiding and abetting 
liability in circumstances in which case law has denied it.”). 
 29. Where Were The Watchdogs? Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of Financial 
Governance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov. Affairs, 111th Cong. 
[hereinafter Levin] (2009) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman Perm. Subcomm. on 
Investigations). 
 30. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—Aiding 
and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and The 
Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 314 (1989). 
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securities laws.”31  Before 1994 one could state with accuracy that 
“[g]eneral standards for several types of secondary liability under the 
federal securities laws have come to be accepted widely.  The commonly 
recognized forms of secondary liability are aiding and abetting, 
conspiracy, controlling person liability, and agency liability . . . .”32 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in Central Bank, the 
imposition of secondary liability for violations of § 10(b) was established 
case law in every circuit.33  There were two accepted doctrines for 
imposing liability on secondary participants that would be applicable to 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola under the Stoneridge facts.  One is the 
foreseeable reliance doctrine, which holds the secondary actor liable if 
the actor knows a wrong is being committed and provides assistance to 
the violator on which the victim would foreseeably rely.34  This clearly 
would apply under the facts assumed in the Stoneridge decision because 
the backdating of the documents to mislead the auditors about the lack of 
a connection between the higher selling price and increased advertising 
sales implies that the secondary defendants did foresee that the victims 
would rely on their actions.  The second previously applicable doctrine 
held the aider liable when the aider knows about the wrongdoing and 
receives a benefit from his assistance.35  In this case, Motorola and 
Scientific-Atlanta benefited from continued revenue that they obtained 
from Charter by keeping Charter out of bankruptcy for an extended 
period of time. 
It is also important to note that under the historical doctrines, liability 
could be imposed by finding the defendant had constructive knowledge, 
acted recklessly, or even assisted by inaction rather than action, although 
a high standard of intent would be required in such inaction cases.36 
                                                     
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 314–15. 
 33. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192 
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also James D. Cox, Just Deserts for Accountants and Attorneys 
After Bank of Denver, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 545 (1996) (aiding and abetting liability for implied 
private actions under the securities laws “had not only been accepted by all the circuits but had 
matured and become predictable, and there was no evidence the doctrine had created mischief in its 
wake”). 
 34. Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Several 
courts have applied a recklessness standard to alleged aiders and abettors who have issued 
statements or certifications foreseeably relied upon by investors, reasoning that a duty to disclose 
arises under such circumstances.”). 
 35. Walck v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 36. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (concluding 
that a failure to act in the presence of a duty satisfies the scienter requirement of aiding and abetting 
liability under Section 10(b)). 
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Prior to the Court’s ruling in Central Bank, the most comprehensive 
discussion supporting aiding and abetting liability was compiled by 
William Kuehnle.  At that time Kuehnle asserted: 
 Although secondary liability is not expressly provided for in the 
federal securities statutes, except for the “controlling person” 
provisions and certain limited references to other forms of secondary 
liability, it has become so well established in the securities law that 
courts rarely question its basis. . . . 
 Secondary liability, including liability for commercial fraud, long 
had been a recognized feature of civil common law at the time of the 
enactment of the federal securities laws.  Congress undoubtedly was 
aware of this when it enacted the laws.  There is also no doubt that 
Congress intended the securities laws to provide protections that were 
at least as good as those which existed at common law.  If long 
established concepts of common-law secondary liability were to be 
excluded from the federal securities laws, the protections provided to 
investors would be less in many cases than those that existed at 
common law.  Such a result seems incompatible with the intended 
purposes of the federal securities laws.37 
Of course, there were some who argued that aiding and abetting 
liability was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.38  Noteworthy 
among these commentators was Professor Daniel Fischel.39  However, all 
circuits recognized the doctrine.40  Even Judge Easterbrook, who was 
hostile to the doctrine, accepted it as established law.41  A few 
commentators argued that the provisions of the federal securities laws 
were exclusive and pre-empted common law doctrines of fraud.42  
                                                     
 37. Kuehnle, supra note 30, at 315–16 (footnotes omitted). 
 38. See, e.g., LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION: A PROBLEM APPROACH 395–
96 (1982); Douglas E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 
1933: “Participation” and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 924 
(1987); Patricia A. O’Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act 
of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 1002 (1984). 
 39. See Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 
1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 98 (1981) (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)) (“Where the language of a statute is 
sufficiently clear—and the failure of Congress expressly to prohibit aiding and abetting, conspiring 
with, or employing a primary violator when contrasted with the controlling person restrictions could 
not be clearer—such language is dispositive without resort to legislative history.”). 
 40. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 192 
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Our court is the home of the 
leading case supporting liability for aiders and abettors . . . and we stand by this conclusion until a 
higher court, not bound by our 20+ years’ precedent, resolves it.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 39, at 97 (arguing that the express means of imposing 
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However, these views were heavily discounted.43  While it is true that 
Congress did not put in a clause expressly providing for secondary 
liability in the context of violations of § 10(b), the argument cuts both 
ways: “Congress could have made, but did not make, any express 
statement in the controlling person provisions that those provisions are 
the exclusive basis for secondary liability.  Proponents of exclusivity 
have a heavy burden to establish that Congress meant something that it 
easily could have said, but failed to say.”44 
Indeed, Congress clearly stated, and the Court had earlier read, that 
the remedies under the federal securities laws are cumulative and in 
addition to remedies existing at common law.  As the Court wrote in 
1983: 
In saving clauses included in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress 
rejected the notion that the express remedies of the securities laws 
would pre-empt all other rights of action.  Section 16 of the 1933 Act 
states unequivocally that “[t]he rights and remedies provided by this 
title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that 
may exist at law or in equity.”  Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act contains a 
parallel provision.  These provisions confirm that the remedies in each 
Act were to be supplemented by “any and all” additional remedies.45 
The Court further observed that “a cumulative construction of the 
securities laws also furthers their broad remedial purpose”46 and 
embraced the theory that Congress ratified judicial interpretations 
providing broad implied remedies to securities fraud.47  This language 
                                                                                                                       
secondary liability are the exclusive means). 
 43. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on 
Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 498 (1995) (“Prior to 
Central Bank of Denver, the lower federal courts overwhelmingly held that aiding and abetting 
liability was appropriate under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”). 
 44. Kuehnle, supra note 30, at 316 (footnote omitted). 
 45. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 
78bb(a)). 
 46. Id. at 386. 
 47. Id. at 384–86 (“This cumulative construction of the remedies under the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
is also supported by the fact that, when Congress comprehensively revised the securities laws in 
1975, a consistent line of judicial decisions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under § 10(b) regardless 
of the availability of express remedies.  In 1975 Congress enacted the ‘most substantial and 
significant revision of this country’s Federal securities laws since the passage of the Securities 
Exchange Act in 1934.’  When Congress acted, federal courts had consistently and routinely 
permitted a plaintiff to proceed under § 10(b) even where express remedies under § 11 or other 
provisions were available.  In light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress’ decision 
to leave § 10(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b) action.” 
(citation and footnotes omitted)). 
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renders a narrow construction of remedies suspect.48  Considering the 
historical context of the 1934 Exchange Act, it is not credible to suggest 
that Congress intended to reduce remedies.49  As I wrote in 1990: 
 Arguments against applying aiding and abetting to federal securities 
laws are refuted by the statutory language, legislative history, and 
recent Supreme Court decisions.  The Securities Act and Exchange Act 
each contain savings clauses that state: “The rights and remedies 
provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and 
remedies that may exist at law or in equity.”50 
These twenty-year-old pre-Central Bank arguments are still being used 
today in connection with Stoneridge.51 
Professor Prentice fairly characterizes Stoneridge as a classic “A 
helps B fool C” case which previously always had resulted in punishment 
for A until the Stoneridge Court labeled the scenario a standard business 
practice.52  The arguments for secondary liability are still persuasive, but 
thus far the Court has not responded favorably and new arguments are 
needed to induce Congress and the President to act in the wake of our 
economic and financial crises.53  The need for secondary liability is not 
solely to provide remedies for isolated investors defrauded by bankrupt 
parties with assistance for profit by solvent and culpable secondary 
actors.  Secondary liability is also needed to create incentives for ethical 
corporate behavior and restore investor confidence in the national market 
for securities.54  The integrity of our entire market is at risk.  Capital is 
being drained and the economy is floundering.  The Court’s decisions are 
incentivizing and encouraging further unethical behavior in the markets, 
and we must put a stop to it before we have many more Enrons and 
Madoffs. 
                                                     
 48. Cf. Prentice, supra note 9, at 612–13 (“[T]he Stoneridge majority opinion . . . represents . . . 
an activist opinion driven primarily by undisguised and quite debatable policy preferences.”). 
 49. Cf. id. at 612 (“[A] majority faction of the Supreme Court ruled . . . that the Section 
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cause of action actually provides markedly less protection than investors enjoyed 
before 1934 rather than more.”). 
 50. Mark S. Klock, Death of a Theory: Pinter v. Dahl and the Scope of Liability Under Section 
12(2) of the Securities Act, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 408, 421 (1990) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t (1982)). 
 51. See supra notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text. 
 52. Prentice, supra note 9, at 615. 
 53. See Levin, supra note 29 (“The current financial crisis has exposed fundamental flaws in 
U.S. financial regulation and demonstrates why it is an absolute necessity to correct them.”). 
 54. Id. (“Legislation reversing Stoneridge would restore civil liability for aiders and abettors of 
corporate fraud.”). 
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1. Central Bank and the Erosion of Secondary Liability 
The Supreme Court threw the securities bar for a loop when it 
announced its decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, provoking much sharp commentary.55  One 
commentator characterized it this way: 
 In a decision that delighted “deep pockets,” shocked the plaintiffs’ 
bar, and befuddled neutral observers, the Supreme Court . . . held that 
aiding and abetting liability in private actions may not be imposed 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or 
under rule 10b-5.  The Court’s decision swept away decades of lower 
court precedent that nearly universally recognized the propriety of such 
secondary liability under the statute and rule.56 
Central Bank was responsible for delaying an independent review of 
an out of date appraisal on real estate used as collateral in a large bond 
issue.57  When the borrowers defaulted soon after the issue, litigation was 
brought against Central Bank.58  Although Central Bank did not actively 
participate in the fraud, its conduct could be found to be reckless and the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Central Bank could be liable for 
aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b).59 
The Supreme Court reversed.60  The five-to-four majority ruled that 
the existing private right of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—
affirmed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores61 and its progeny—
did not cover aiding and abetting violations because aiding and abetting 
lacks “connection with the purchase or sale.”62  The determination of 
who is a seller under § 12 previously had been construed narrowly by the 
Court in Pinter v. Dahl,63 and the Court chose to continue the narrow 
construction of who is a seller and apply it to the “connection with the 
purchase or sale” language under § 10(b).64  “The Supreme Court 
                                                     
 55. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 43, at 490 (calling the Court’s disregard for investor 
protection from fraud “callous”). 
 56. Id. at 489 (citations omitted). 
 57. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 167–68 
(1994). 
 58. Id. at 168. 
 59. Id. at 168–69. 
 60. Id. at 192. 
 61. 421 U.S. 723, 732–49 (1975) (considering the limitations on the class of plaintiffs that can 
maintain a private cause of action under Section 10(b)). 
 62. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173, 175–77. 
 63. 486 U.S. 622, 653–55 (1988). 
 64. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173. 
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discarded a doctrine that had not only been accepted by all the circuits 
but had matured and become predictable, and there was no evidence the 
doctrine had created mischief in its wake.”65  In a sharply worded 
dissent, Justice Stevens wrote: 
 In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every 
Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded 
that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.  While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of the 
theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 Courts of Appeals to 
have considered the question have recognized a private cause of action 
against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  The early 
aiding and abetting decisions relied upon principles borrowed from tort 
law; in those cases, judges closer to the times and climate of the 73d 
Congress than we concluded that holding aiders and abettors liable was 
consonant with the Exchange Act’s purpose to strengthen the antifraud 
remedies of the common law.  One described the aiding and abetting 
theory, grounded in “general principles of tort law,” as a “logical and 
natural complement” to the private § 10(b) action that furthered the 
Exchange Act’s purpose of “creation and maintenance of a post-
issuance securities market that is free from fraudulent practices.”66 
The Supreme Court’s hostility toward private actions became even 
more transparent after its decision in Gustafson v. Alloyed Co.67  The 
five-to-four Gustafson majority declared that the private right of 
rescission under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) for 
material misrepresentations in a prospectus did not apply to private sales 
in a secondary distribution by a controlling shareholder.68  This novel 
rule was fabricated without foundations.69  As I have previously stated, 
                                                     
 65. Cox, supra note 33, at 545. 
 66. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192–93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brennan v. Midwestern 
United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966)) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 67. 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 68. Id. at 584. 
 69. See id. at 584–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas concludes: 
  The majority’s analysis of § 12(2) is motivated by its policy preferences.  Underlying 
its reasoning is the assumption that Congress could never have intended to impose 
liability on sellers engaged in secondary transactions.  Adopting a chiding tone, the 
majority states that “[w]e are reluctant to conclude that § 12(2) creates vast additional 
liabilities that are quite independent of the new substantive obligations that the Act 
imposes.”  Yet, this is exactly what Congress did in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act as well as in 
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  Later, the majority says: “It is not plausible to infer that 
Congress created this extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer 
and seller in the secondary market.”  It is not the usual practice of this Court to require 
Congress to explain why it has chosen to pursue a certain policy.  Our job simply is to 
apply the policy, not to question it. 
  . . . . 
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“[t]he decision [in Gustafson] is so poorly reasoned and so contrary to 
the sixty years of thinking and practicing under the Securities Act that 
bias flashes on every page.  Gustafson has been described as ‘the most 
poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven securities opinion in recent 
memory.’”70 
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
Another complication in the rise and fall of secondary liability prior 
to Stoneridge is Congress’s 1995 legislation titled the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).71  The major thrust of the Act was to 
erect procedural barriers in securities class actions in order to reduce 
perceived abuses in non-meritorious strike suits.72  Much commentary 
and debate surrounded both the empirical basis for the Act as well as its 
likely effects.73  However, one important provision was included in the 
Act in reaction to Central Bank.74  That provision expressly authorized 
                                                                                                                       
  Unfortunately, the majority’s decision to pursue its policy preferences comes at the 
price of disrupting the process of statutory interpretation.  The majority’s method turns on 
its head the commonsense approach to interpreting legal documents. . . . 
  The majority’s methodology also has the effect of frustrating Congress’ will. . . .  The 
majority does not permit Congress to implement its intent unless it does so exactly as the 
Court wants it to. 
Id. at 594–96 (internal citations omitted). 
 70. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 BUS. 
LAW. 1231, 1231–32 (1995); Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 43. 
 71. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-
5 (2006)). 
 72. See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss, The Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or 
“Look What’s Happened to My Baby”, 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547 (2008) (“These data led us to 
conclude that if class action procedures could be reformed [it would] . . . reduce substantially the 
agency costs associated with securities class action litigation.”). 
 73. Compare Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 492 (1996) (finding evidence of nuisance suits) with Edward Labaton, A View 
From the Trenches, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 513, 513–14 (1996) (criticizing studies for defining settlements 
under $2 million as “nuisance” suits when cases are often settled for under $2 million due to 
insurance limits, insolvency, and other reasons and further stating that frivolous suits in the class 
action area are small because attorneys do not take cases which will not earn them a living).  For 
further criticism of the Act’s empirical basis, see Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A 
Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 597 (1991) (suggesting that 
securities class action settlements do not reflect the merits and that shareholder derivative suits suffer 
from the same criticism).  But note that Professor Alexander’s conclusions are based on a sample of 
only nine companies.  Id. at 517 tbl. 4.  And they involve only initial public offerings of computer 
and computer related companies during six months of 1983.  Id. at 507.  The empirical facts continue 
to be debated more than a decade later.  See generally, James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs 
and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 355, 355–86 (2008). 
 74. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768 (2008) 
(“The decision in Central Bank led to calls for Congress to create an express cause of action for 
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the SEC to bring enforcement actions for aiding and abetting violations 
of federal securities laws.75   
Unfortunately, the Act was silent as to whether private actions for 
damages could pursue aiders and abettors.76  Thus, the Act provided 
some arguments on both sides.77  By expressly authorizing the SEC to 
pursue aiding and abetting violations it is at least arguable that Congress 
legislatively overturned the Central Bank decision by expressly making 
aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 illegal.78  On the 
other hand, by expressly providing for secondary liability in SEC 
enforcement actions and considering, but not doing so for private 
enforcement actions, Congress arguably affirmed Central Bank with 
respect to private enforcement.79 
Nevertheless, even if Congress did not wish for private victims of § 
10(b) violations to have a cause of action against aiders and abettors, that 
does not imply that Congress intended to exempt from liability those 
secondary actors who participated at a higher level than mere aiding and 
abetting.80  In particular, the Ninth Circuit approved of the theory of 
scheme liability.81  Under this theory, tortfeasors that did not actually 
purchase or sell a security could be liable if they participated with the 
seller in a scheme to defraud investors.82  This provides the setting for 
Stoneridge, which gave the Court an opportunity to decide the argument. 
C. The Stoneridge Decision and Analysis 
1. The Majority Opinion 
The holding of Stoneridge is hard to fathom.  The Court began its 
opinion with a short and sweet summary of its conclusion in the first 
paragraph: 
                                                                                                                       
aiding and abetting within the Securities Exchange Act.”). 
 75. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 104, 15 U.S.C. 78t(e) (2006). 
 76. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768–69. 
 77. See generally Prentice, supra note 9, at 648–51 (discussing arguments on both sides 
relating to the legislative intent underlying legislation expressly providing for SEC prosecution for 
aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b) while keeping silent on private rights of action). 
 78. See id. at 650–51 (arguing that Congress granted the SEC power to use those convicted of 
aiding and abetting under § 10(b) because the Central Bank decision did not address this possibility). 
 79. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768–69. 
 80. Id. at 778–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 81. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006), judgment 
vacated, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008), opinion 
vacated, Simpson v. Homestore, 519 F. 3d 101 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 82. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049–50. 
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In this suit investors alleged losses after purchasing common stock.  
They sought to impose liability on entities who, acting both as 
customers and suppliers, agreed to arrangements that allowed the 
investors’ company to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading 
financial statement affecting the stock price.  We conclude the implied 
right of action does not reach the customer/supplier companies because 
the investors did not rely upon their statements or representations.83 
In other words, the Court concluded that because the defendant 
customers and suppliers only participated in the sham transactions but 
did not create the financial reports that relied on the sham transactions, 
they are not liable to the victims of the fraud.84  I cannot recall a Supreme 
Court opinion with a more callous analysis of causation. 
The Court’s decision that the fraud committed by the aiders and 
abettors was too remote to be “connected” with the purchase or sale of 
the securities85 at issue was a key error.86  Notwithstanding the majority’s 
assertion to the contrary, a moment of reflection about the possible 
motivation for falsely amortizing current expenses and booking 
nonexistent revenue in public filings with the SEC necessarily leads one 
to conclude that the primary intent was to promote the sale of securities 
at an inflated price.87  There is no alternative economic incentive to 
engage in such conduct.  Indeed, this analysis of intent is a textbook 
illustration of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.88 
To begin, note that the reason corporate officers are tempted to 
overstate earnings is to inflate stock prices.  A discussion of this 
temptation can be found in the ethics chapter of an introductory finance 
textbook.89  Common sense tells that the purpose of requiring publicly 
filed financials to be signed off by a certifying accountant is to make it 
difficult for corporate officers to overstate earnings and to provide 
investors with a minimal degree of confidence that the earnings estimates 
are fairly reported.90  Finally, it is also obvious that the reason that other 
                                                     
 83. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766. 
 84. Id. at 774. 
 85. Id. at 770–71. 
 86. Id. at 774–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87. Cf. IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 906 (2009) (“Usually, fraud 
involves manipulation of financials.”). 
 88. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 110–14 
(1998) (discussing why managers introduce misleading information into the stock market). 
 89. See generally WELCH, supra note 87, at 896–943 (chapter on corporate governance 
covering managerial conflicts of interests and an extensive menu of tactics used by managers to 
enrich themselves). 
 90. See SUNDER, supra note 19, at 124 (“The public believes that auditors are responsible for 
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corporations would engage in sham transactions and draft documents to 
disguise the related transactions as unrelated is to deceive the auditors 
and perpetrate a fraud in the public market for stock.91 
Two legal points are worth observing here.  First, these res ipsa 
loquitur factual conclusions appear on their face to satisfy the plain 
language of the 1934 Act, which prohibits, directly or indirectly, the 
employment of a device or scheme to defraud any person “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.”92  The technical acrobatic 
leaps that have been used by some Justices and lower court judges to 
constrain the meaning of “device” and “connection with” are truly 
amazing.93  Second, the remedies provided by the 1934 Act are 
cumulative and do not limit investor rights that existed under common 
law.94  Thus, the Stoneridge decision would be amazing were it not for 
the fact that the securities bar knew in advance of the Court’s hostility 
towards investor class actions against corporations.95 
Even without reliance on a theory of scheme liability or aiding and 
abetting liability, Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta were liable as primary 
participants under the plain language of the statute.96  Section 10(b) 
makes it illegal “to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
                                                                                                                       
the detection of fraud.  Indeed, they see it as the reason why they are willing to pay for the audit.”). 
 91. Indeed, the Stoneridge majority opinion observed this obvious point: 
  So that Arthur Andersen would not discover the link between Charter’s increased 
payments for the boxes and the advertising purchases, the companies drafted documents 
to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of 
business. . . . 
  . . . The backdating was important to convey the impression that the negotiations were 
unconnected, a point Arthur Andersen considered necessary for separate treatment of the 
transactions. 
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. 
 92. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 93. Describing the Stoneridge majority’s argument, Professor Prentice wrote: 
The Stoneridge majority noted that the language of Section 10(b) requires that to be 
actionable a fraud must be “in connection with” a purchase or sale.  The Court then 
declined to examine the in-connection-with requirement.  One must suspect that the fact 
the in-connection-with requirement was obviously met in this case has something to do 
with that decision. 
Prentice, supra note 9, at 658 (citations omitted). 
 94. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (“[T]he rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition 
to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity . . . .”).  See also MARC I. 
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 622–24 (2004) (discussing the legal basis for a cumulative 
remedies approach). 
 95. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A theme that underlies the Court’s 
analysis is its mistaken hostility towards the § 10(b) private cause of action.”). 
 96. Id. at 774. 
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rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .”97  Rule 
10b-5, adopted by the SEC under the authority of § 10(b), makes it 
unlawful “to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”98  The majority 
decision turns on the causal “connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”99 
The short answer to the question as to whether the conduct provided 
the sufficient causal connection is given by Basic Inc. v. Levinson.100  In 
Basic the Court held the reliance requirement could be established by 
reliance on a price in a public market containing false information.101  
This is the well known fraud-on-the-market theory.102  Basic has never 
been overruled, and prior to Stoneridge the Court had never held that 
investors must be aware of the specific conduct.103  The Stoneridge 
majority did not dispute the contention that the victims relied on the 
market price and would not have bought the stock at that price had the 
victims known of the fraud.104  The Court held instead that the sham 
transactions were too remote to the purchase.105  What the majority failed 
to consider is that under the statutory scheme investors should be entitled 
                                                     
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 
 98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2009). 
 99. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
view that reliance requires super-causation in the purchase of securities). 
 100. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 101. See id. at 241–47 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the 
proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class 
action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.  The District Court 
found that the presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory provided ‘a 
practical resolution to the problem . . . .’”); see also Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market 
Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 443–44 (2007) (“In Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, the United States Supreme Court made it easier for plaintiffs alleging securities fraud 
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 to prove the essential element of reliance.  The Court held that under 
the so-called fraud-on-the-market theory, a plaintiff who purchased securities on an “open and 
developed” market can be presumed to have relied on the integrity of the market price and in that 
way to have relied, indirectly, on allegedly false or misleading public statements of the defendants.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 102. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class 
Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 358–59 (2007) (explaining that the efficient market theory provides 
the basis for reliance and causation); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market 
Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 458–59 (2006) (describing the fraud-on-the-
market theory); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 138–
39 (2006) (same). 
 103. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 770 (majority opinion). 
 105. Id. at 774. 
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to rely on the veracity of the auditors.106  Given that Motorola and 
Scientific-Atlanta backdated some of their agreements and drafted other 
documents for the purpose of fooling the auditors into believing that the 
sale of the set-top boxes and the purchase of the advertising were 
unrelated, how is it logically possible that their misconduct was not 
related to a fraud on the market in connection with a purchase of 
securities?107  Engaging in sham transactions supported with false 
documentation calculated to mislead the auditors that certify the financial 
reports surely provides a causal connection between the deception and 
the purchase of the securities.108  Even though it is true that Charter could 
have subsequently stopped the fraud, that does not relieve the joint 
tortfeasors of liability for their bad acts.109 
For the Court, the key to the decision was the simple fact that the 
preparation of the financial statements was not contemporaneous with 
the creation of the backdated and fraudulent transactions to which 
Scientific and Motorola were participants.110  This simplistic analysis is 
clearly and concisely stated in the concluding paragraph of the opinion: 
Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in the 
marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere.  
Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its books, conferring 
with its auditor, and preparing and then issuing its financial statements.  
In these circumstances the investors cannot be said to have relied upon 
any of respondents’ deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell 
securities; and as the requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents 
have no liability to petitioner under the implied right of action.111 
This analysis is like asserting that the car engine plays no role in the 
forward movement of a vehicle because the transmission could be shifted 
                                                     
 106. Cf. EDMUND L. JENKINS, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, THE FASB’S ROLE 
IN SERVING THE PUBLIC 5–7 (explaining that in order for capital markets to flourish, investors must 
be able to rely on summary information provided by accountants and assurances given by auditors), 
available at http://72.3.243.42/news/fasb_role.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). 
 107. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The allegations in this case . . . 
plainly describe ‘deceptive devices’ under any standard reading of the phrase.”). 
 108. Id. at 776–77. 
 109. See Sinai, supra note 6, at 183 (“Where it is known by the conspirators that the falsified 
information is going to be distributed to the public and potential investors, that ought to be the basis 
for the creation of a ‘duty’ to that group, a duty not to deceive them; not to defraud them.”). 
 110. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (“No member of the investing public had knowledge, either 
actual or presumed, of the respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times.  Petitioner, as a 
result, cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect chain that we find 
too remote for liability.”). 
 111. Id. at 774. 
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to reverse gear.112  Even though we can distinguish components of an 
automotive power train, that does not imply that the distinct components 
operate independently in isolation.  The parts function in connection 
together.  The same is true of markets.  Product markets and financial 
markets are intertwined, and to assert that a fraud could not have met the 
reliance requirement in the securities market because the fraud took place 
in the product market is not logical.113  The markets are connected like a 
hammer’s head and handle, and when one part is moved the other part 
necessarily follows.  Transactions in the product market directly affect 
prices in the securities markets.114  This is what the prices, which are 
subjective valuations about the future, are based on.115  Additionally, the 
reporting and misreporting of those transactions in the product market 
directly affect prices in the securities markets.116  The late Professor 
James Tobin of Yale University received a Nobel Prize in large part for 
his work explaining the linkage between the market for physical assets 
and financial markets.117  The Stoneridge majority has created a 
contrived distinction for the purpose of eliminating liability by the 
perpetrator of a but-for cause of the securities fraud.118  The distinction 
between preparing the financial statements and providing the sham 
transactions upon which the financial statements were based is arbitrary 
and whimsical.119 
Under such a restrictive interpretation of § 10(b), there will be few 
instances in which assisting in fraudulent product-market transactions to 
                                                     
 112. Cf. Prentice, supra note 9, at 657 (providing analogous hypothetical in which C gives a 
bogus promissory note to B for a fee knowing that B intends to use the note to defraud A, but under 
Stoneridge, C’s conduct would be too disconnected to impose liability since B could have stopped 
the fraud). 
 113. See Mark Klock, The SEC’s New Regulation ATS: Placing the Myth of Market 
Fragmentation Ahead of Economic Theory and Evidence, 51 FLA. L. REV. 753, 778–79 (1999) 
(explaining that market integration necessitates that “the information contained in transactions in one 
market is quickly reflected in the other markets so that all the markets effectively operate as a single 
market”). 
 114. Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside Trading, 10 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 297, 323 (1994) [hereinafter Klock, Mainstream Economics] (explaining that markets 
cannot operate independently and that what happens in one market impacts the other). 
 115. See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 21, at 105 (“[F]amiliarity with these valuation matters 
reveals the ephemeral nature of the concept of value.  The apparent numerical precision of the end-
product of valuations masks the significant subjectivity of the conclusion.”). 
 116. See SUNDER, supra note 19, at 102–03 (discussing the effects of accounting reports on 
stock prices). 
 117. Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 114, at 298. 
 118. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 776 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the wash transactions as a but-for cause). 
 119. Cf. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 96 (pointing to the inherently whimsical 
nature of the assumptions underlying financial statements). 
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manipulate information in the public marketplace for securities can be 
found to form a basis for reliance.  The lesson seems to be that if the 
fraudulent transactions can be classified as involving transactions for 
goods and services rather than transactions for financial products, private 
actions under the securities laws will not be available no matter how 
much harm was wrought on the public securities markets.120  In the 
words of one commentator: 
 Under Stoneridge, a professional can rest easy so long as the 
attorney, CPA, and investment banker make no statements to the 
public.  It appears no matter their culpability, they will escape private 
civil liability under § 10(b).  As mere “aiders and abettors,” Stoneridge 
excludes them from coverage under § 10(b) and the Rule.  The lawyer 
that works, plans and schemes with his client to deceive and defraud 
the investing public, but who is careful to make no public statements, is 
free of civil liability under the Eighth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s 
current view as expressed in Stoneridge.121 
The Court also insincerely characterized the case as one involving 
lack of a duty of disclosure on the part of the vendors and customers of 
Charter.122  Although these vendors and customers do not have an 
affirmative duty to disclose facts to Charter’s stockholders, that does not 
imply that they have a license to perpetuate fraud against the 
stockholders.123  A duty is created by their misconduct.124  The vendors 
and customers knowingly participated in sham transactions; it is 
unconscionable for the Court to turn a blind eye to this.  Just because one 
owes no duty to save a drowning victim absent some special relationship 
does not mean that one can lure the victim into the drowning pool.125  
This example is perfectly analogous with Stoneridge and the federal 
securities laws’ requirement of reliance.  As Kuehnle wrote two decades 
ago, “[O]ne who helps prepare false statements can be held liable as a  
 
                                                     
 120. See Sinai, supra note 6, at 187 (stating that the Supreme Court has rewritten federal 
securities law to make private actions inapplicable “unless the ‘act’ or ‘course of business’ 
committed by a defendant is also accompanied by his direct misstatement to investors or the 
market”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (“Respondents had no duty to disclose . . . .”). 
 123. See generally Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 18–19 (discussing the basis for the 
proposition that absence of a duty to disclose does not render one immune from liability for 
misdisclosure and fraud). 
 124. Sinai, supra note 6, at 183–84. 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. d (1965). 
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primary violator even if the person is not present when the statements are 
transmitted to the victim.”126 
An exemplary case relying on this analysis in the context of 
securities fraud was decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in Malone 
v. Brincat.127  In Malone, the directors of a publicly-traded Delaware 
corporation filed false financial statements with the SEC.128  Rather than 
pursue a claim under the federal securities laws, the plaintiffs brought a 
claim in state court for breach of fiduciary duty and included defendants 
who allegedly aided and abetted the breach.129  The lower court 
dismissed the case with prejudice on the theory that directors have no 
duty of disclosure to shareholders absent a request for shareholder 
approval.130  The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed and held that 
directors cannot, directly or indirectly, mislead shareholders via 
corporate disclosures.131  In the words of the court: 
 Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false 
communications from directors even in the absence of a request for 
shareholder action.  When the directors are not seeking shareholder 
action, but are deliberately misinforming shareholders about the 
business of the corporation, either directly or by a public statement, 
there is a violation of fiduciary duty.132 
The Malone Court also held that the accountants who assisted in the 
preparation of the false financial statements filed with the SEC could be 
held liable to the shareholders for aiding and abetting a breach of 
fiduciary duty.133  Delaware is not the only state to recognize aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders as a basis for legal 
liability in a shareholder class action.134 
The fact pattern in Stoneridge shows that Motorola and Scientific-
Atlanta aided and abetted Charter’s breach of fiduciary duties to its 
shareholders.  Because Charter and Motorola are both Delaware 
corporations and, given the hostility of the United States Supreme Court 
                                                     
 126. Kuehnle, supra note 30, at 319. 
 127. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 128. Id. at 8. 
 129. Id. at 7–8. 
 130. Id. at 8. 
 131. Id. at 11–12. 
 132. Id. at 14. 
 133. Id. at 15. 
 134. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation: 
Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 213, 
241–42 (1997) (stating that courts are split but a majority of jurisdictions recognize the claim). 
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to private actions under the securities laws, one wonders why counsel did 
not attempt to bring the action in the Delaware state court.  The Delaware 
Supreme Court has further extended Malone’s corporate context to apply 
to the relationship between a broker and a client in O’Malley v. Boris.135  
This finding further highlights the substitution of state corporate law 
remedies for federal securities law protection under the United States 
Supreme Court’s continued contraction of remedies.136  Fragmented state 
protection in a national market is undesirable and requires congressional 
action with leadership and support by the new President.137 
Troubles in the real estate sector lead to troubles in the financial 
sector, and vice versa.138  We cannot protect the integrity of the financial 
markets if we provide for immunity from civil liability where the fraud is 
consummated in the product market.139  The Stoneridge rule not only 
permits unethical conduct, it actively encourages unethical conduct with 
pecuniary rewards.140 
2. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, harshly 
criticized the reasoning of the Court and concluded that the alleged 
conduct of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola constituted a primary 
violation of § 10(b).141  The dissent succinctly summarized the case: 
 Charter Communications, Inc., inflated its revenues by $17 million 
in order to cover up a $15 to $20 million expected cash flow shortfall.  
It could not have done so absent the knowingly fraudulent actions of 
                                                     
 135. 742 A.2d 845, 849–50 (Del. 1999) (drawing an analogy between the broker-client 
relationship and director-shareholder relationship). 
 136. See Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 45 (observing the expanded role of state law 
in the face of diminishing federal investor protection). 
 137. See generally Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities 
Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 359–67 (2007) (providing comprehensive theoretical and 
empirical analysis of the advantages of mandatory federal securities regulation relative to state 
regulation or privatized regulation or deregulation). 
 138. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 460, 463–64 (2006) (making the case that strong economic development and strong financial 
markets are mutually interdependent). 
 139. See Prentice, supra note 9, at 661–62 (noting that fraud behind the transactions underlying 
published financial statements deceives the entire market). 
 140. See Sinai, supra note 6, at 187 (observing that Stoneridge empowers professionals to 
participate in schemes to deceive and defraud investors as long as they take care to avoid making 
public statements). 
 141. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 777 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s view of reliance is unduly stringent and unmoored from 
authority.”). 
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Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc.  Investors relied on Charter’s 
revenue statements in deciding whether to invest in Charter and in 
doing so relied on respondents’ fraud, which was itself a “deceptive 
device” prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
This is enough to satisfy the requirements of § 10(b) and enough to 
distinguish this case from Central Bank . . . .142 
Further explaining the fraudulent acts prohibited by § 10(b), the dissent 
stated that, “[t]he allegations in this case—that respondents produced 
documents falsely claiming costs had risen and signed contracts they 
knew to be backdated in order to disguise the connection between the 
increase in costs and the purchase of advertising—plainly describe 
‘deceptive devices’ under any standard reading of the phrase.”143  This 
distinguishes Stoneridge from Central Bank because the defendant in 
Central Bank was not a participant to the fraud.144  Central Bank of 
Denver had only been negligent in delaying an independent real estate 
appraisal in a declining market before the underlying bond issuance was 
completed.145  That conduct was vastly different from creating sham 
transactions coupled with false and misleading documentation.146 
The Court’s conclusion that the deceptive acts committed by 
Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did not subject them to liability in a 
private action under § 10(b) because the deceptive acts did not directly 
cause investors harm would be laughable were it not such a serious 
matter.  The Court concluded that the deceptive acts could not possibly 
have caused the investors’ harm essentially because the investors did not 
know about them.147  The elements of § 10(b) were satisfied by the 
allegations that the respondents engaged in a fraud which they knew or 
should have known would enter the marketplace and the petitioners 
relied on the market price.  The dissenters remarked: 
 In Basic Inc., [the Court] held that the “fraud-on-the-market” theory 
provides adequate support for a presumption in private securities 
actions that shareholders (or former shareholders) in publicly traded 
companies rely on public material misstatements that affect the price of 
                                                     
 142. Id. at 774 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). 
 143. Id. at 775. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 167–
68 (1994). 
 146. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he facts in Central Bank would 
mirror those in the case before us today if the bank had knowingly purchased real estate in wash 
transactions at above-market prices in order to facilitate the appraiser’s overvaluation of the 
security.”). 
 147. Id. at 769 (majority opinion). 
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the company’s stock.  The holding in Basic is surely a sufficient 
response to the argument that a complaint alleging that deceptive acts 
which had a material effect on the price of a listed stock should be 
dismissed because the plaintiffs were not subjectively aware of the 
deception at the time of the securities’ purchase or sale.  This Court has 
not held that investors must be aware of the specific deceptive act 
which violates § 10b to demonstrate reliance.148 
The dissent is buttressed by common law fraud principles.  Under 
common law fraud, the defendants would be liable.149  The dissenters 
observed that although § 10(b) is not the same as common law fraud, it 
was intended to be broader “because common-law fraud doctrines might 
be too restrictive.”150  The dissenters were also critical of the majority for 
its distinction between the realm of financing and ordinary business 
transactions: 
Because the kind of sham transactions alleged in this complaint are 
unquestionably isolated departures from the ordinary course of business 
in the American marketplace, it is hyperbolic for the Court to conclude 
that petitioner’s concept of reliance would authorize actions “against 
the entire marketplace in which the issuing company operates.”151 
Finally, the dissent argues that the majority makes too much out of 
Congress’s omission of aiding and abetting liability with respect to 
private enforcement.152  Even if Congress did not intend to permit private 
actions for aiding and abetting, it surely did not intend to eliminate 
private actions against primary participants.153 
3. Result-Driven Reasoning? 
The egregious nature of the fraud in Stoneridge seems to be an 
obvious case for holding the corporations who unethically booked sham 
transactions to facilitate a profitable relationship liable as primary 
participants.154  This provides credibility for the cynical view that the 
decision was result-driven.155  This view, that the Court was eager to 
                                                     
 148. Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 777. 
 150. Id. (citing Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1983)). 
 151. Id. at n.4 (quoting majority opinion, 771). 
 152. Id. at 777–79. 
 153. Id. at 778–79. 
 154. See id. at 774 (“This [fraudulent action] is enough to satisfy the requirements of § 
10(b) . . . .”). 
 155. See supra notes 48 and 49 and accompanying text. 
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have an opportunity to limit the express cause of action for secondary 
liability that Congress inserted into the PSLRA, was publicized by early 
commentators.156  In order to have the opportunity to limit the language 
providing for secondary liability, it was necessary for the Court to reach 
the conclusion that there was insufficient causal connection between the 
conduct and the fraud in the financial market.157  So the Court ruled that 
knowingly falsifying dates and documentation on sham transactions to 
help mislead auditors did not have the requisite causal connection 
because the sham transactions themselves were not communicated to the 
investing public.  Only the false financial reports that were built on the 
sham transactions—reports that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did not 
prepare or disseminate—were transmitted to the investing public.158  This 
novel theory used by the majority dichotomizes transactions between the 
financial markets and the product markets.159  Such a dichotomy is a 
fairytale with no basis in reality.160  The markets are so closely connected 
that they can only be distinguished for pedagogical purposes, not for 
real-world law making.161 
The fact that these defendants should have been liable as primary 
participants under the plain meaning of the statute inevitably leads to the 
conclusion that the majority wanted to reach a result to unequivocally 
eliminate liability for “secondary actors” as much as possible in light of 
Congress’s express provision allowing the SEC to bring actions against 
aiders and abettors effectively making aiding and abetting conduct 
expressly illegal.  Subsequent to Central Bank, the Ninth Circuit 
embraced the theory of “scheme to defraud liability” for reaching 
secondary participants in securities fraud in Simpson v. AOL Time 
Warner.162  The theory of scheme liability is that the secondary actors 
                                                     
 156. See Prentice, supra note 9, at 668–69 (“Any reading of the Stoneridge opinion clearly 
indicates that the majority faction was uncommonly determined to read Section 10(b) in an 
exceedingly stinting fashion.”). 
 157. See id. at 651 (explaining that because the Stoneridge defendants were involved in such 
blatant fraud, the majority could not merely label them aiders and abettors without first ruling 
erroneously that the investors did not rely on the defendants’ acts). 
 158. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774 (majority opinion). 
 159. See id. at 770 (effectively asserting that investors in an efficient market are only entitled to 
rely on the financial statements, not the transactions underlying the financials). 
 160. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (2d ed. 1997).  Professor 
Stiglitz explains that a change in one market will lead to a new equilibrium for the whole economy.  
“Competitive general equilibrium entails prices, wages, and returns to capital such that all markets—
for goods, labor, capital (and other factors of production)—clear.”  Id. at 318. 
 161. See id. at 226 (“The two markets are linked: the financial investments people make provide 
firms with the funds they need to undertake real investments.”). 
 162. 452 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006), judgment vacated, Avis Budget Group, Inc. v. Cal. 
State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008), opinion vacated, Simpson v. Homestore, 519 F.3d 
 
0.6.0_KLOCK FINAL 1/4/2010  10:30:31 AM 
334 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
were doing more than merely rendering assistance—they were active 
participants in a scheme to defraud.163  The poor reasoning by the 
Stoneridge majority—that fraud calculated to mislead the certifying 
accountants was too remote to meet § 10(b)’s reliance requirement—
appears to be driven by the eagerness to create what the majority 
incorrectly perceives as a “pro-business” rule to discourage litigation.164 
The recent frauds in the “pro-business” environment have greatly 
damaged confidence in the market.165  The value of stock has fallen 
immensely and businesses find it expensive or impossible to raise 
capital.166  Even though Stoneridge could have been decided without 
considering aiding and abetting claims, I argue that the remedy is to 
expressly provide for aiding and abetting liability in order to deter 
unethical business practices and restore confidence in our financial 
markets. 
An interesting hypothetical reveals the fragile nature of the 
majority’s analysis.  Suppose that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did 
not help inflate the revenues of an unhealthy company.167  Suppose 
instead that they had engaged a healthy firm in sham transactions to 
understate profits.  Suppose that all parties involved purchased stock at 
the resulting depressed price, and then issued corrected financial 
statements showing the accurate and higher profits, selling the stock that 
had been acquired at depressed prices for a handsome profit.  In this case 
the defendants would be liable under the majority analysis because they 
would have received their compensation in the act of buying securities 
directly from stockholders.  Nevertheless, their actual wrongful conduct 
that created the harm to the shareholders was the fraud in the product 
market calculated to mislead auditors, analysts, and investors about the 
                                                                                                                       
1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 163. Simpson, 452 F.3d at 1049. 
 164. Cf. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771 (“[Section] 10(b) . . . should not be interpreted to provide a 
private cause of action against the entire marketplace in which the issuing corporation operates.”). 
 165. See Eric Lipton and Ron Nixon, A Bank With Its Own Woes Lends Only a Trickle of 
Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 (quoting the Treasury official in charge of the TARP 
bailout program to say that “[w]e’re still in a period of fairly low confidence”). 
 166. David E. Sanger, U.S. Bank And Trust?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1 (reporting that 
large financial institutions are finding it very difficult to raise the capital needed to continue 
operating). 
 167. Charter Communications is the fourth largest cable company in the United States and a 
Fortune 500 firm.  Charter, About Charter, http://www.charter.com/Visitors/AboutCharter 
.aspx?NonProductItem=20.  Nevertheless, its debt is rated CCC and its stock traded for three cents 
per share on February 20, 2009—a drop from more than twenty-three dollars per share in July of 
2001 before the scam became known.  Yahoo! Finance, Charter Communications Inc., http:// 
finance.yahoo.com/q?s=CHTRQ.PK (follow the “max” hyperlink under the chart on the right side of 
the screen) (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).  It is not a financially healthy corporation. 
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value of the securities.  The fact that the Stoneridge defendants took the 
fruits of their fraud in the form of sustaining a profitable relationship 
with a financially unhealthy business gives rise to the majority’s 
justification for calling this an ordinary business transaction that 
immunizes the vendor-customers from liability under the federal 
securities laws.  This is a substance-trumps-form result that counters 
Congress’s intent when it crafted the federal securities laws.  Under a 
law that expressly allows investors to bring claims against aiding and 
abetting violations of § 10(b), the unethical substantive conduct would be 
deterred regardless of which form it takes. 
Presumably the majority’s desire to obtain this result is driven by a 
good-faith belief that lawsuits are bad for business and the economy, but 
the fact of the matter is that fraud is worse for business.168  Economic 
theory drives much of the conservative branch of the federal judiciary’s 
reasoning.169  For example, Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner are 
known for their use of economics, and are also widely viewed as 
conservative.170  But economic theory is full of examples of market 
failures and recommendations for government and legal intervention.171  
Markets susceptible to fraud make one of the most compelling 
justifications for intervention under economic theory.172  The remedy 
                                                     
 168. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (“Because fraud turns the securities market into a 
‘market for lemons,’ there is a consensus in the securities field that fraud is bad.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 1 
(2001) (“[M]y thesis is that the basic tools of microeconomics can illuminate social phenomena that 
traditionally have not been subjects of economic inquiry.  Economists have developed analytic tools 
of unmatched power for dealing with the consequences of differences among individuals (and 
firms).”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, On the Direct Election of CEOs, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 261, 262 
n.10 (2006) (at least partly attributing the rise and dominance of law and economics analysis to the 
conservative political movement that began with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan); Robert A. 
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 
95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 133 (2001) (“For more than two decades, the economic theory embodied in 
the law and economics movement has been the ascendant paradigm in legal analysis . . . .”). 
 170. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1773 n.578 (2003) (suggesting that Circuit Court Judges 
Easterbrook and Posner are part of a widespread conservative movement developed by Henry 
Manne with corporate and conservative foundation support). 
 171. Cf. RICHARD W. TRESCH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 4 (1981) (“[T]he 
competitive market economy is seen as the ideal economic system, so much so that competitive 
market failure is a necessary condition for public sector activity.”). 
 172. See Cross & Prentice, supra note 137, at 338–39.  Professors Cross and Prentice give a 
lucid explanation of the economic problem: 
The basic economic problem is how to control the investment risk so that investors will 
be willing to risk their funds. Solving or ameliorating this problem is of enormous social 
value.  Absent a solution, many investors will choose not to play the game at all, while 
others will discount the securities they purchase to take into account the increased risk of 
loss. 
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provided by economic theory is to reduce information asymmetry by 
providing incentives for full and fair disclosure.173  Expansion of liability 
for aiding and abetting securities fraud provides the appropriate 
remedy—a market-based incentive structure.174 
The result of the Court’s holding creates moral hazard, whereby 
economic incentives to behave ethically are removed and positive 
economic incentives to engage in unethical conduct are created.175  This 
leads to economic inefficiency, which means that society’s resources are 
allocated in a wasteful manner.176  People will not put their savings to the 
best possible use because credit markets and trust break down.177 
This scheme is inherently inconsistent with the long-established and 
undisputed fact that Congress enacted the securities laws to protect the 
integrity of the financial markets.178  An analysis that allows perpetrators 
such as Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola to profit from their fraud (by 
collecting revenue from Charter longer than they otherwise could have) 
and escape liability under securities laws by classifying their actions as 
being limited to the product markets is based on a fairytale theory in 
which markets are disconnected.  Public policy arguments, 
Congressional intent, and common sense all lead to the same conclusion: 
the Court’s result is flawed and the contorted reasoning used to attain the 
result only illuminates the flaws, and these flaws have consequences. 
                                                                                                                       
  Blind trust is not much of a solution, as managers face great temptations of 
opportunism. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 173. FREDERIC S. MISHKIN & STANLEY G. EAKINS, FINANCIAL MARKETS & INSTITUTIONS 372 
(6th ed. 2009) (“The solution . . . is to eliminate asymmetric information by furnishing the people 
supplying funds with full details about the  individuals or firms seeking to finance their investment 
activities.”). 
 174. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 105 (expanding liability improves disclosure 
incentives and limiting liability weakens them). 
 175. See Cross & Prentice, supra note 137, at 336 (“Andy Fastow, Bernie Ebbers, Ken Lay, Jeff 
Skilling, Jack Grubman, Henry Blodgett, Richard Scrushy, Dennis Kozlowski, Mark Swartz, 
Richard Causey and so many others decided to forfeit their reputations in exchange for short-term 
lucre . . . .”). 
 176. Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really Virtues? Use and Abuse of 
Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 198 (2003). 
 177. See George A. Akerlof, Behavioral Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Behavior, 92 
AM. ECON. REV. 411, 413 (2002) (“The failure of credit markets is one of the major reasons for 
underdevelopment.”) [hereinafter Akerlof, Macroeconomic Behavior]. 
 178. See STEINBERG, supra note 94, at 523 (“Generally, the antifraud provisions of the securities 
acts were designed to protect investors, to assure fair-dealing in the securities markets, and to 
promote ethical business practices.”). 
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III. FORUM SHOPPING: SECONDARY LIABILITY IN STATE COURTS 
The Stoneridge decision will result in an increase in forum shopping 
as securities fraud plaintiffs looking for viable legal theories to reach 
culpable deep pockets are forced to plead cases involving this basic fact 
pattern as aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.179  Unlike 
standard tort principles under common law, Stoneridge has built a flawed 
concept of duty into the federal securities laws, and certainly into § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.  The majority’s decision asserts that parties that owe no 
duty to shareholders cannot be liable for deceptive conduct that 
ultimately harms shareholders as long as there is no direct connection.180  
Under the Court’s analysis there is no direct connection sufficient to 
establish reliance when the deceptive conduct takes place in the product 
market and the participants do not communicate directly with the 
shareholders.181 
Under standard negligence analysis, one who does not owe a duty 
need not act to save a drowning victim.182  But a duty can be created by 
misconduct.183  If A pushes B into a pool, A has a duty to rescue B if B 
begins to drown.184  This analogy is not quite applicable in Stoneridge 
because Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola did not prepare and disseminate 
the false financial statements.185  The appropriate analogy would be one 
where A knowingly sets into place a chain of events that he could foresee 
would cause B to fall in the water.  Under standard negligence analysis, 
A would still have a duty to rescue B resulting from A’s misconduct.186  
This hypothetical is in fact analogous to what Scientific-Atlanta and 
Motorola actually did, with a profit motivation thrown in.  Indeed, 
Professor Prentice has also highlighted this flaw in the majority’s 
reasoning, pointing out that the majority failed to ask two related but 
                                                     
 179. See Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 45 (observing that increased difficulty in 
bringing federal securities claims will move plaintiffs to plead breach of fiduciary duty against 
Delaware corporations and their aiders and abettors). 
 180. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965) (“The origin of the rule lay in 
the early common law distinction between action and inaction, or ‘misfeasance’ and ‘non-
feasance.’”). 
 183. See Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 18. 
 184. Id. (“While directors might not be obliged to give information absent special circumstances, 
neither can they push the shareholders into a pool of false information and watch without liability.  
This . . . suggests that directors have a duty not to deceive shareholders because such deception 
constitutes an interference with shareholder rights.”). 
 185. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. 
 186. Sinai, supra note 6, at 183–84 (“[I]t is clear that if some scheme would defraud a specific 
foreseeable group, then this ought to create the duty to such group: a duty not to defraud.”). 
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distinct questions.  The majority asked only whether the plaintiffs relied 
on the defendants’ acts, which of course they did not because they were 
unaware of the deceptive conduct in the product market—that is what 
made the fraud a profitable opportunity.187  But the correct questions 
were: did the investors “rely on deceptive statements” and were “the 
defendants legally responsible for those deceptive statements?”188  The 
answer to both questions should have been yes;189 just as A would be 
liable for B’s drowning if A knowingly set into place events that 
foreseeably caused B to fall into deep water. 
Unfortunately, in light of Stoneridge, this conduct is not actionable 
under the federal securities laws until Congress enacts a remedy.190  
However, under Malone and O’Malley, the conduct is clearly actionable 
under Delaware law.191  Even where there is no duty to disclose, directors 
and officers breach their fiduciary duty to shareholders when they 
communicate misinformation to their shareholders.192  Aiding and 
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable under Delaware law.193  
Given that Charter and Motorola are Delaware corporations, it is 
unfortunate for the plaintiffs that the action was not filed in Delaware 
courts under the alternate theory. 
The resulting incentive to bring securities class actions to the more 
favorable forum of Delaware does not lead to a uniform policy for 
protecting the integrity of the national market.  If investors cannot be 
confident that the financial statements released are not fraudulent, and if 
investors know that the solvent individuals who profit from fraud might 
be insulated from liability, then investors must seriously consider the 
state in which corporations are incorporated before purchasing stocks.194  
Although the viability of obtaining compensation for corporate 
wrongdoing in Delaware and some other state courts is beneficial for the 
unfortunate victims that can bring such claims, it is clearly a poor model 
                                                     
 187. Prentice, supra note 9, at 652. 
 188. Id. at 653. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774. 
 191. O’Malley v. Boris, 742 A.2d 845, 850 (Del. 1999); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 
1998); see Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 44–45 (concluding that Malone and O’Malley 
provide authority for defrauded investors to bring claims in Delaware based on aiding and abetting). 
 192. Malone, 722 A.2d at 14. 
 193. See id. (holding that a claim of aiding and abetting a breach of duty could be articulated on 
the facts). 
 194. Cf. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 16–18 (1993) (citing 
empirical studies showing that investors weigh the terms of corporate governance before purchasing 
stocks). 
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for regulation of what is undeniably a national market.195  Furthermore, 
Congress clearly sought to limit forum shopping when it enacted the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).196 
SLUSA was designed to prevent investors from bringing securities 
claims into state courts and avoid the procedural hurdles erected under 
the PSLRA.197  However, SLUSA contained a provision commonly 
known as the “Delaware carve-out,” which exempted claims based on a 
breach of fiduciary duty under state law.198  In light of this provision, the 
necessary conclusion that Stoneridge will result in more forum shopping 
must certainly be another unintended consequence of the poorly reasoned 
decision.  The forum-shopping consequence only adds to the need for 
aiding and abetting liability. 
IV. THE NEED FOR AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY IN PRIVATE 
ACTIONS 
A. Economic Theory Justifies Aiding and Abetting Liability 
The unfortunate facts are that Central Bank and Stoneridge violate 
the Court’s own precedents and create highly contrived distinctions to 
reach a result that is probably motivated by good intentions but based on 
an unrealistic premise, and they are causing more harm than good.  For 
example, in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner,199 the Court 
                                                     
 195. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude Is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the 
United States Financial Regulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 377 (2008) (“[R]egulatory structures that rely on multiple regulators, 
such as the United States, may overregulate when compared to structures that use a single regulator 
because multiple regulators produce overlapping and conflicting regulations.”); James D. Cox, 
Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200, 1244 (1999) (“Thus, the 
history of the blue sky laws dramatically documents that the natural tendency of state regulatory 
competition is a race to the bottom.  We find not only a weak interest among the states to impose 
disclosure demands greater than those of the SEC, but also that in those instances in which a state’s 
restrictions are a burden, the issuer’s tendency is to shop for a less demanding state where its 
offering can occur.  Certainly this is not a record to suggest that the states will have a balanced view 
toward the needs of investors and issuers.  Their own history illustrates that competition for offerings 
has caused a weakening and not a strengthening of securities regulation standards.”); Karmel, supra 
note 12, at 544. 
 196. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 197. See Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour, Recent Judicial and Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Private Securities Fraud Class Action, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1028 
(1998) (“Scarcely had the ink dried on the Reform Act when the new congressional proposals . . . to 
preempt state securities fraud lawsuits began to emerge.”). 
 198. Klock, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 11, at 16 n.114. 
 199. 472 U.S. 299 (1985). 
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rejected, for the purposes of determining the availability of the equitable 
in pari delicto defense under the securities laws, attempts to distinguish 
between express and implied causes of action.200  Further, the Court 
found private causes of action to be an important tool, stating that “we 
repeatedly have emphasized that implied private actions provide ‘a most 
effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws and are ‘a 
necessary supplement to Commission action.’  In addition, we have 
eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities 
laws.”201  In other cases, the Court has held that remedies under the 
securities laws are cumulative and not less than common law remedies, 
that Congress’s intent in passing the securities laws was to protect the 
investing public, and that the Court will not find interpretations that 
frustrate this intent.202  Obviously Central Bank moved away from these 
attitudes, but Stoneridge has gone much further—Central Bank merely 
involved a negligent defendant, not willing and active participants to the 
fraud as in Stoneridge.203 
There is a superficially reasonable argument for the proposition that 
securities litigation causes more harm than good.  The argument is that 
the entire economy bears the costs of the litigation.204  This is a cynical 
view that implicitly assumes that lawyers will always be quick to bring 
meritless suits and that corporate officers’ conduct and ethical behavior 
will not respond to economic incentives.205  As long as the liability rules 
protect unethical conduct, unethical conduct that is profitable will be 
widespread.206  But if the liability rules governing the market are changed 
to punish unethical conduct, the amount of unethical conduct will 
decrease.207  Economic theory predicts that decision-makers respond to 
                                                     
 200. Id. at 309–10. 
 201. Id. at 310 (citations omitted). 
 202. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386–87 (1983). 
 203. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 775 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (contrasting the Stoneridge facts with those of Central Bank). 
 204. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting 
Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993) (concluding that 
securities litigation raises the cost of capital). 
 205. Cf. Prentice, supra note 9, at 664.  Professor Prentice reaches the logical conclusion that: 
  The majority faction’s argument can sound persuasive only to those who either 
assume that all federal securities lawsuits are spurious or who believe that the legal 
system cannot ever distinguish between a valid claim and a specious claim.  The majority 
faction’s policy preferences seem to be only just below the surface in this reasoning. 
Id. 
 206. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 106 (changing liability rules will promote 
more ethical conduct). 
 207. Robert A. Prentice, Locating that “Indistinct” and “Virtually Nonexistent” Line Between 
Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691, 778–79 (1997) 
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incentives.208  Moreover, changing the relative costs of different 
activities will affect the choices made by decision-makers.209  Private 
actions against corporations involved in fraud can save more than they 
cost through the deterrent effect in reducing fraud.  Less fraud will allow 
all corporations to obtain capital at a lower cost from confident 
investors.210  The New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and all other 
trade associations that represent large corporations should be lobbying 
Congress to amend the securities laws to provide for a private cause of 
action for aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b).211 
There is a very good reason why a scheme of secondary liability is 
essential for rebuilding and maintaining the integrity of financial 
markets.  If players in financial markets are always given the benefit of 
the doubt when they engage in questionable activities which are not 
clearly illegal, then financial market participants are effectively being 
encouraged with economic incentives to engage in shady conduct.212  
This is effectively the well-known moral hazard problem that was 
rigorously explored by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth 
Arrow and is a principal topic in the insurance field.  Moral hazard exists 
when people are encouraged to engage in undesirable behavior because 
they are insulated from its consequences.213  For example, a homeowner 
who does not take precautions against fire and even engages in 
                                                                                                                       
(“Setting broad parameters of liability should reduce fraud, increase fairness, improve the accuracy 
of financial reporting, and, thereby, improve the efficiency of our financial markets consonant with 
the goals established by Congress for the 1934 Act.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 208. See STIGLITZ, supra note 160, at 32 (stating that “incentives are at the heart of modern 
economics”). 
 209. Id. at 181. 
 210. See Cross & Prentice, supra note 137, at 337 (“Investors inevitably face a risk by handing 
their money over to be managed by others, as their resources may be lost through theft or 
mismanagement . . . .  [E]fforts to address this risk short of securities law have failed.”). 
 211. Consider what a leading finance professor wrote in his best-selling textbook in a 
prominently highlighted and set-off paragraph captioned “IMPORTANT”: 
Investors would not be willing to provide capital at favorable terms if they are not well 
protected.  The entrepreneur ultimately internalizes any potential future failures caused 
by an inadequate corporate design today.  Thus, to raise money on good terms in the first 
place, entrepreneurs want to design the firm and its governance structure so that investors 
will be protected. 
WELCH, supra note 87, at 898. 
 212. See Sinai, supra note 6, at 187 (observing that, under the Supreme Court’s current view, 
professionals can profit from fraud provided they exercise care to avoid public statements in the 
market). 
 213. See 2 KENNETH J. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the 
Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 133, 142–44 (1983) [hereinafter ARROW, Economic Activity] (defining 
moral hazard). 
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hazardous activities because he is fully insured.214  Or, a driver who is 
reckless because he has too many safety devices to suffer serious injury 
and is fully insured against property and liability losses.215  Insurance 
companies mitigate the effects of moral hazard through, among other 
things, the use of deductibles, which make the customers less than fully 
insured.216  The moral hazard now has its place in the securities markets, 
thanks to the protection from liability granted by Stoneridge.217 
The economic and legal policy problems that result from this 
decision can be considered in depth after examining the words of 
Professor Arrow.  He classified this as a problem of “confounding risks 
and decisions,”218 and observed that the problem is applicable to a wide 
range of contexts: 
 In fact, it is not a mere empirical accident that not all the contingent 
markets needed for efficiency exist, but a necessary fact with deep 
implications for the workings and structure of economic 
institutions. . . .  The very existence of insurance will change individual 
behavior in the direction of less care in avoiding risks.  The insurance 
policy that would be called for by an optimal allocation of risk bearing 
would only cover unavoidable risks and would distinguish their effects 
from those due to behavior of the individual.  But in fact all the insurer 
can observe is a result, for example, a fire or the success or failure of a 
business, and he cannot decompose it into exogenous and endogenous 
components.  Contingent contracts, to speak generally, can be written 
only on mutually observed events, not on aspects of the state of the 
world which may be known to one but not both of the parties.219 
My point, using Arrow’s terminology, is that Stoneridge insulates 
wrongdoers by shielding them from the avoidable risks created by their 
decisions.  Charter’s investors obviously could not write a contract with 
Charter’s suppliers to cover the risks of fraud perpetrated by such 
suppliers, and therefore the investors need the legal system to provide 
                                                     
 214. See 2 KENNETH J. ARROW, General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, 
Collective Choice, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 199, 222 
(1983) [hereinafter ARROW, Economic Equilibrium] (explaining moral hazard in the context of 
insurance). 
 215. See Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 59–64 (1982) (examining 
empirical evidence of higher accident mortality rates in states that have switched to no-fault 
insurance schemes). 
 216. MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 173, at 577. 
 217. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 778 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority opinion as immunizing an undefined class of 
defendants against liability). 
 218. ARROW, Economic Activity, supra note 213, at 143. 
 219. ARROW, Economic Equilibrium, supra note 214, at 222. 
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protection.220  If Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were held liable for 
their actions, the moral hazard problem and the resulting economic 
inefficiency would vanish.  However, we cannot afford to wait for 
another case and a more economically sophisticated Court.  We need 
legislation that expressly puts unethical corporate officers and others on 
notice that they will be liable to victims for these risk-creating 
decisions.221  Placing the risk of the decision on the decision-maker is the 
way to restore efficiency and confidence to the market.222 
The improved ethical standards that would result from an application 
of aiding and abetting liability can be illustrated with a simple 
examination of how the statutory scheme works in cases of primary 
liability under the 1933 Act.223  The Act prohibits the sale of securities in 
the public market unless the securities have been registered,224 and the 
registration statement must contain all material facts.225  Economic 
incentives to comply with § 77e are given by § 77l, which states the 
consequences for either failure to register securities sold in the public 
market or omission of a material fact.226  The consequences are strict 
liability for losses by all purchasers without any requirement for reliance 
or causation.227  Suppose it is questionable as to whether the securities 
are sold in the public market.  Liability can be avoided by adhering to the 
requirements of the safe harbors for private placements promulgated by 
the SEC.228  If an issuer does not avail himself of the safe harbor rules 
and sells securities without registering them, then he can expect that at a 
minimum he will incur substantial costs down the road litigating the 
question as to whether the offering was public.  Suppose it is 
questionable as to whether a fact is material.  If it can be argued either 
                                                     
 220. This need must be filled by statute.  Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal 
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 212 (2006) 
(“Corporation codes consist of default rules that supply standard contract terms for corporate 
governance where the parties fail to specify alternative arrangements.”). 
 221. See Levin, supra note 29 (calling on Congress to overturn Stoneridge to prevent continued 
unfairness to investors). 
 222. See R. Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors’ Liability: A Proposal For 
Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411, 433 (1988) (“Placing the burden of risk upon decision 
makers both compensates shareholders for their losses and serves to deter directors from careless 
decision making.”). 
 223. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2006). 
 224. § 77e. 
 225. § 77k. 
 226. § 77l. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to 
Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
861, 933 (2005) (describing the safe harbor of SEC Rule 506). 
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way, then the prudent course of action is to include the fact in the 
registration statement and avoid litigation.229  The system deters shady 
behavior operating in an ethical gray zone. 
This system of strict liability for less than full disclosure promotes 
ethical behavior.  A system of secondary liability for aiding and abetting 
fraud would also promote ethical conduct and enhance investor 
protection and confidence in the market.  If it is unclear as to whether 
assisting a violation of securities laws is wrong, then imposing liability 
will discourage shady and questionable conduct.  A rule that allows 
everything except that which is not expressly prohibited encourages 
excessive unethical behavior and will drive capital out of the market.  
This concept was advanced by Nobel Prize-winning economist George 
Akerlof in his classic article on market breakdowns in the absence of 
trust: 
Informal unwritten guarantees are preconditions for trade and 
production.  Where these guarantees are indefinite, business will 
suffer . . . .  [T]he difficulty of distinguishing good quality from bad is 
inherent in the business world; this may indeed explain many economic 
institutions and may in fact be one of the more important aspects of 
uncertainty.230 
Professor Akerlof was the first to carefully explain how quality 
differentials in the presence of information asymmetry affects markets.231  
He observed that the absence of integrity in the credit markets of less 
developed countries is critical to understanding why such countries 
continue to remain less developed.232  He also commented that 
institutions can sometimes develop to counteract the problems caused by 
information asymmetry.233  I suggest that a regulatory framework that 
provides private civil liability for aiding and abetting fraud in the 
financial markets would go far toward increasing trust in the marketplace 
and reducing the economic costs of dishonesty.  The costs of dishonesty 
are clearly explained: 
                                                     
 229. See Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982) (“[T]he prospectus is a disclosure document, an insurance policy against 
liability.  With the view toward protection against liability, there is a tendency to resolve all doubts 
against the company and to make things look as bleak as possible.”). 
 230. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970) [hereinafter Akerlof, “Lemons”]. 
 231. See MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 173, at 371 (describing the importance and fame of this 
scholarship). 
 232. Akerlof, “Lemons”, supra note 230, at 497–99. 
 233. Id. at 499–500. 
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Consider a market in which goods are sold honestly or dishonestly; 
quality may be represented, or it may be misrepresented.  The 
purchaser’s problem, of course, is to identify quality.  The presence of 
people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to 
drive the market out of existence . . . .  It is this possibility that 
represents the major costs of dishonesty—for dishonest dealings tend to 
drive honest dealings out of the market.  There may be potential buyers 
of good quality products and there may be potential sellers of such 
products in the appropriate price range; however, the presence of 
people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out 
the legitimate business.  The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only 
in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must 
include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of 
existence.234 
In accepting his Nobel Prize more than thirty years later, Professor 
Akerlof wrote, “In some markets, asymmetric information is fairly easily 
soluble by repeat sale and by reputation.  In other markets, such as 
insurance markets, credit markets, and the market for labor, asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers is not easily soluble and results 
in serious market breakdowns.”235 
In financial markets, the cost of dishonesty is particularly severe.236  
It drives capital out of the market, which increases the cost of what 
scarce little capital remains.237  Investment becomes unprofitable, growth 
stops, and the economy slides further, taking jobs with it.238  Another 
Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, explained that it only takes a small 
amount of information asymmetry to create a substantial effect.239  “Talk 
is cheap” and, therefore, not credible.240  If a firm has no credible way to 
communicate to the public that its financial records are not based on 
sham transactions with businesses that are immune from liability, then 
                                                     
 234. Id. at 495. 
 235. Akerlof, Macroeconomic Behavior, supra note 177, at 413. 
 236. See MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 173 at 29 (“The problems created by adverse selection 
and moral hazard are an important impediment to well-functioning financial markets.”). 
 237. See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and Progressive 
Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 281 (2008) 
(suggesting that corporate directors’ wrongdoing precipitates a flight of capital from the markets). 
 238. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systematic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 214 (2008) (“Investors lose 
confidence and begin withdrawing their money from the remaining capital markets, weakening those 
markets and—due to a perception, if not reality, of heightened default risk—leading to a significant 
widening of credit spreads and a resulting higher cost of capital.  In a vicious cycle, the increased 
cost of capital triggers defaults and also causes further liquidations of positions (to generate cash) 
and thus, more price-drops.”). 
 239. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 460, 461 (2002). 
 240. Id. at 471. 
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our markets are in deep trouble.241  But our markets could be saved if we 
have the will to impose private liability for aiding and abetting fraud. 
The theory of regulation is rooted in economics.242  The public 
choice field uses the tools of economics to analyze politics,243 and shows 
that optimal regulation involves a balance between the marginal benefit 
and marginal harm of the rule.244  Where markets function perfectly, 
there is no benefit to regulation, there is only the potential for harm.  
Where some type of market problem such as asymmetric information or 
moral hazard exists, there is the potential for designing regulation to 
improve the functioning of the market.245 
Regulation is typically desired in the event of a market failure.  The 
literature of information economics has taught that, “[u]nder the 
imperfect information paradigm, markets are almost never Pareto 
efficient.”246  In other words, regulation is required to make securities 
markets efficient. 
Optimal regulation should provide the maximum benefit at minimum 
cost.  Sometimes bright-line rules are optimal; sometimes they are not.  
After the Enron fraud became public, I argued: 
[P]recise rules can have the effect of encouraging everyone to operate 
in the ethical gray zone.  The expressed minimum standard of conduct 
becomes acceptable.  What is not expressly prohibited becomes ethical.  
Conversely, a rule imposing liability for less than full and fair 
disclosure should lead to disclosure in questionable matters.247 
                                                     
 241. See Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 105 (“The reduction in liability risk for 
auditors after Central Bank may have drastically reduced the value of audits and impaired the 
markets.”). 
 242. See generally Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & 
ECON. 211 (1976) (extending the theory of regulation); cf. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the 
Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 549 (1970) (“[M]oral arguments are frequently either sham 
or a refuge for the intellectually bankrupt.”). 
 243. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 1 (1989) (“Public choice can be defined as the 
economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to political 
science.”). 
 244. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 943 (1999) (observing that regulation is 
frequently conducted using cost-benefit analysis). 
 245. See STIGLITZ, supra note 160, at 153 (“When there is a market failure, government may be 
able to correct the market failure and enhance the economy’s efficiency.”). 
 246. Stiglitz, supra note 239, at 468.  “Pareto efficiency” occurs when the allocation of resources 
is such that “no one can be made better off without making somebody else worse off.”  STIGLITZ, 
supra note 160, at 320. 
 247. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 106. 
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Legislation providing liability for assisting violations of the federal 
securities laws and making the remedy available in private actions will 
result in a higher standard of conduct in the corporate world.  This is an 
objective which has been sought for years.248 
B. Case Study: Enron and Merrill Lynch 
As an example of the serious magnitude of the problem of 
diminished liability for fraud, we only need to look at Enron 
Corporation.  Enron’s massive fraud was aided by many financial market 
players, including financial giant Merrill Lynch.249  Merrill was not held 
liable for its role in the collapse,250 but not because of favorable facts and 
presumptions.251  To the contrary; Merrill escaped liability because the 
law, as interpreted by the courts, does not extend to aiders and abettors 
and because participants in a fraud who do not directly communicate 
with the market are no more than aiders and abettors.252 
In Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First 
Boston (USA), Inc. it was revealed that Merrill Lynch had actively 
planned to help prolong Enron’s fraud by assisting the company in 
moving toxic assets off the books and making a large loan appear to be  
 
                                                     
 248. Id. at 105 (“The reduction in liability risk for auditors after Central Bank may have 
drastically reduced the value of audits and impaired the markets.  This impairment of the markets is 
where attention should be focused.  The original philosophy of full and fair disclosure, and the 
historical development of implied private rights of action and aiding and abetting liability fostered 
the growth of our capital markets into the envy of the world.  It was a mistake to depart from that 
regime, and it is time to return to it.”). 
 249. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 377 
(5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1120 (2008); see also KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF 
FOOLS 293–96 (2005) (documenting various transactions and participants that helped to facilitate 
Enron’s collapse). 
 250. David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Investors’ Suit Against Enron Bankers, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2008, at C3. 
 251. See Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 393 (“We have applied the Supreme Court’s guidance in 
ascribing a limited interpretation to the words of § 10, viewing the statute at the result of Congress’s 
balancing of competing desires to provide for some remedy for securities fraud without opening the 
floodgates for nearly unlimited and frequently unpredictable liability for secondary actors in the 
securities markets.”). 
 252. Id. (“We recognize, however, that our ruling on legal merit may not coincide, particularly in 
the minds of aggrieved former Enron shareholders who have lost billions of dollars in a fraud they 
allege was aided and abetted by the defendants at bar, with notions of justice and fair play.  We 
acknowledge that the courts’ interpretation of § 10(b) could have gone in a different direction and 
might have established liability for the actions the banks are alleged to have undertaken.”); see also 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (holding that 
reliance is presumed when stock statements become public). 
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an infusion of equity.253  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described 
one of these transactions: 
 For example, plaintiffs allege that Merrill Lynch engaged in what 
they dub the “Nigerian Barges Transaction.”  According to plaintiffs, 
Enron wanted to “sell” its interest in electricity-generating barges off 
the coast of Nigeria by the end of 1999 so that it could book revenue 
and meet stock analysts’ estimates for the calendar quarter.  It could 
find no legitimate buyer, so it contacted Merrill Lynch and guaranteed 
that it would buy the barges back within six months at a premium for 
Merrill Lynch. 
 Six months later, Enron made good on its guarantee; an Enron-
controlled partnership bought the barges from Merrill Lynch at a 
premium.  When Enron reported its results for 1999, instead of booking 
the transaction as a loan, the characterization that Enron’s outside 
accountants state would have been appropriate had they known of the 
side-agreement to buy back the barges, Enron booked the transaction as 
a sale and accordingly listed the revenue therefrom in its year-end 
financial statement. 
 Plaintiffs allege that the banks knew exactly why Enron was 
engaging in seemingly irrational transactions such as this.  They cite 
certain of the banks’ internal communications they characterize as 
proving that the banks were aware of the personal compensation Enron 
executives received as a result of inflating their stock price through the 
illusion of revenue and that the banks intended to profit by helping the 
executives maintain that illusion.254 
Merrill Lynch was risky and engaged in unethical conduct.255  But 
the law, as created by the Supreme Court in Central Bank and its 
progeny, encouraged Merrill’s actions.  The Fifth Circuit found Merrill 
not liable; its conduct did not constitute a misrepresentation “on which 
an efficient market may be presumed to rely” and was not 
manipulative.256  The unethical conduct by Merrill enabled Enron to 
continue its fraud for at least another year and ultimately increased the 
number of defrauded investors and the magnitude of losses that shocked 
the markets.257  Despite its egregious role in the Enron collapse, Merrill 
                                                     
 253. Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM 208 (2003) 
(reporting that a Merrill executive noted concerns over the reputational risk of aiding and abetting 
Enron’s income manipulation). 
 256. Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 390. 
 257. See id. at 377 (observing that the “Nigerian Barges Transaction” took place in 1999 and 
Enron collapsed in 2001). 
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was legally protected from liability as the result of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions.  Ironically, Central Bank facilitated the size of the fraud 
perpetuated by Enron (with Merrill Lynch’s assistance). 
In Stoneridge, the Court had an opportunity to limit Central Bank’s 
damage, but instead chose to enhance it.  It is clear that the Stoneridge 
majority did not consider the conduct of Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta 
to be socially desirable.258  The PSLRA plainly makes aiding and 
abetting illegal.259  Moreover, the theory of scheme liability endorsed by 
the Ninth Circuit—holding willing and active participants in the fraud 
liable—is clearly consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Central 
Bank.260  Instead, the Court chose to use a sophomoric distinction 
between product markets and securities markets to conclude that no 
causal connection existed between the unethical corporate conduct and 
investor losses.261  This is breaking new ground and tramples investor 
rights more than ever before.262  The result is a transparent manifestation 
of the Court’s hostility towards private litigation.263 
The Court was clearly motivated by its desire to limit private rights 
of action under the securities laws because it believes that private 
enforcement causes more harm than good.264  The empirical facts do not 
support this belief.265  Moreover, the Court conveniently ignores the 
collateral damage caused by the moral hazard that it has created and 
nurtured.  The alternative system of holding secondary participants who 
are a substantial factor in the wrongdoing liable will promote ethical 
                                                     
 258. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008) 
(noting that criminal penalties are a strong deterrent to this conduct). 
 259. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). 
 260. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774–75 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of the Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 21, Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 
452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-55665), 2004 WL 5469571). 
 261. Supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 262. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s view of the causation 
required to demonstrate reliance is unwarranted and without precedent.”). 
 263. See id. at 779 (citing the Court’s “mistaken hostility” towards and continuing campaign to 
render private actions toothless); Prentice, supra note 9, at 677 (“So eager was the Stoneridge 
majority to put limits upon the right of fraud victims to obtain recompense that it cast aside this 
previously self-imposed restraint on the use of policy arguments and returned to the precedent of 
earlier cases that considered policy arguments.”). 
 264. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772 (majority opinion) (suggesting that secondary liability would 
raise the costs of doing business). 
 265. See id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“But liability for those who violate § 10(b) ‘will not 
harm American competitiveness; in fact, investor faith in the safety and integrity of our markets is 
their strength.’”) (citing Motion for Leave to File Brief Out of Time and Brief Amici Curiae of 
Former SEC Commissioners in Support of Petitioner at 9, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2065260). 
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conduct in financial markets more than it will promote strike suits.266  
The economic benefits will outweigh the economic costs.267 
C. The Importance of Promoting Market Efficiency 
Some recent commentary on Stoneridge has argued for adoption of 
the substantial participation standard and revitalization of scheme 
liability.268  Although these principles advance the integrity of the 
marketplace, their adoption by this Court has less chance of happening 
than the lottery being won by someone who does not play it.  Although 
the fraud committed by the supporting characters can be fairly 
characterized as a primary violation of § 10(b), as the dissenting Justices 
argued, a broader range of protection for the marketplace is needed in 
our current environment.  Financial fraud has become a big-time growth 
industry.269  It is time to amend the federal securities laws to expressly 
provide for a private cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of 
§ 10(b) in order to protect investors and allow the market to function 
more efficiently. 
In an efficient market investors can be confident that they will earn a 
fair rate of return on average.270  An efficient capital market also ensures 
entrepreneurs, small businesses, and corporations the ability to obtain 
necessary capital at the lowest possible cost.271  Efficient capital markets 
fuel economic growth.272  But when investors believe their expected 
                                                     
 266. See id. at 778 n.10 (“The success of the U.S. securities markets is largely the result of a 
high level of investor confidence in the integrity and efficiency of our markets.”) (citing S. REP. NO. 
104-98, p. 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687). 
 267. John Coffee, ‘Regulation-Lite’ Belongs to a Different Age, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at 11 
(observing that since deterrence works, cross-listed foreign companies realize a drop in their cost of 
capital when listing on the NYSE, but not when listing on the London Stock Exchange). 
 268. See Seth S. Gomm, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and the Supreme Court’s Attempt to Determine the Issue of 
Scheme Liability, 61 ARK. L. REV. 453, 454 (2008) (“Although the current Court is unlikely to allow 
private scheme-liability actions in the near future, Congress may act in favor of shareholder-
plaintiffs when it sees the wisdom of allowing such § 10(b) actions.”). 
 269. See, e.g., Zathrina Perez et al., Securities Fraud, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 923, 991 (2008) 
(discussing the growing problem of online financial fraud). 
 270. See Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 114, at 306 (“In a fair game each investor’s 
expected return is commensurate with his level of risk.” (citation omitted)). 
 271. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734 (1984) (“Depending on a firm’s share price, its cost for 
obtaining capital will be either too high or low as compared to the cost that would prevail in a 
perfectly efficient market.”). 
 272. See Coffee, supra note 267 at 11 (observing that our markets provide capital at low cost and 
the “lower cost of capital carries potential benefits for the broader society: namely, a higher gross 
domestic product and lower unemployment”). 
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returns will be lower than what is actuarially fair, they will pull capital 
out.273  The flight of capital results in diminished business investment, 
fewer jobs, less tax revenue to fund government programs, and more 
economic hardship.274  We should implement aiding and abetting liability 
not just to promote better ethical practices in the industry, but also to 
promote strong investor confidence and economic growth.275 
The optimality of well-functioning economic markets is widely 
understood,276 and so is the disastrous effect that fraud can have on 
markets.277  We know the cure for fraud: 
 The beauty of the theoretical competitive market is that all problems 
are self-correcting.  Unfortunately, reality is not as beautiful.  The ideal 
competitive market takes all widgets as homogeneous.  In reality, we 
have quality differentials, an imperfect ability to observe those quality 
differentials, and different information regarding quality differentials.  
Such is the situation regarding legal claims to future property, 
otherwise known as financial instruments or securities.  Fraud increases 
the informational asymmetry and cannot only cause the market to 
function poorly, it can cause the market to cease to exist altogether.  
Regulation to prohibit fraud can restore some beauty to the market if 
well-designed and enforced. 
 Historically, regulators adopted a philosophy of policing fraud and 
requiring honesty and integrity to promote confidence in the market.  
The concept of full and fair disclosure has served the market well.  
When the federal securities laws were originally established, the idea of 
paternalistic merit regulation was considered and rejected, with good 
reason.278 
A regime in which private actions against all participants are available to 
redress fraud will cure this massive fraud problem. 
                                                     
 273. See Klock, Mainstream Economics, supra note 114, at 331 (“When confidence is 
promoted . . . outsiders will invest more heavily in the market.  This lowers the cost of capital to 
business, increases aggregate investment, and improves overall economic welfare.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 274. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2541, 2592 (2006) (“Without well-organized and efficient markets, companies will have difficulties 
finding capital to finance their business, which would raise capital costs and impede the entire 
economy.”). 
 275. See supra notes 265 and 266 and accompanying text. 
 276. See, e.g., MISHKIN & EAKINS, supra note 173, at 19 (“Well-functioning financial markets 
also directly improve the well-being of consumers . . . .  Financial markets that are operating 
efficiently improve the economic welfare of everyone in the society.”). 
 277. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 786–87 (2001) (explaining how weak investor protection 
discourages honest firms from selling securities). 
 278. Klock, Fortune Tellers, supra note 19, at 76–77 (citations omitted). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A significant factor in creating the present financial and economic 
crisis was fraud in the subprime mortgage industry, which spilled over 
into the broad financial sector and then the entire economy.279  We have 
also witnessed spectacular financial scandals such as Enron.  Even after 
the enactment of regulatory reforms we learn about massive and 
widespread Ponzi schemes perpetrated in our markets.280  Prestigious 
names among giants such as Arthur Andersen and Merrill Lynch have 
been revealed to routinely engage in unethical business practices for 
short term gain rather than protect their reputation and future earnings 
potential.281  Now more than any time during the past seventy years we 
need to act to shore up our market confidence. 
At one time, a relatively small segment of the public invested in 
publicly-traded securities.  Now a significant proportion of the U.S. 
population owns publicly-traded stocks, either directly or indirectly.282  A 
major trend in the investment world has been the remarkable growth of 
stock ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans.283  
Additionally, there has been even more remarkable growth in mutual 
funds.284  These trends make the direct importance of the financial 
markets to the majority of the U.S. public obvious. 
However, there are also less obvious reasons why the financial 
markets are critically important, even to those who have no wealth tied to 
the level of the market.  A simple summary of the immediate effects is 
that financial markets affect the cost of raising capital, which in turn 
affects the profitability and level of investment, which in turn affects 
employment, output, and income.285  Poorly functioning financial 
markets will lead to a high cost of capital which in turn causes otherwise 
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profitable opportunities for investments to become unprofitable.286  
Alternatively, well functioning markets lead to minimal costs in raising 
capital, which promotes greater levels of investment and its 
accompanying economic benefits.287  “Prosperity provides the engine by 
which limited possibilities are expanded.”288 
The economic benefits of well-functioning financial markets are 
obvious.289  Investors and businesses are able to overcome the credit risk 
associated with lending to strangers at the most minimal level of 
transactional costs thereby promoting saving and investment.290  Low 
capital costs result in a growing and vibrant economy with jobs and 
opportunity for all.  But the financial markets cannot flourish if investors 
are not protected from fraud.291  The fraud alleged against the vendors 
and customers of Scientific-Atlantic was particularly egregious and 
clearly something that the investing public should be protected against 
with more than a casual caveat emptor.  The remedy is simple—provide 
a private cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of § 10(b).  
Such regulation provides market-based incentives for ethical conduct 
rather than ineffective micro-regulations.  This case should result in a 
renewed call by members of the securities bar to lobby for civil liability 
in private actions in securities cases and overturn the disastrous result in 
Stoneridge with new legislation removing judicially created doctrines 
that immunize aiding and abetting securities fraud.292 
A barring of secondary liability would be a rejection of long-
recognized principles and would produce, contrary to the purpose of the 
federal securities laws, investor protections that in many cases would 
be less than existed at common law.  The statutory controlling person 
provisions were not intended to preclude other forms of secondary 
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liability, but were intended to provide an additional basis of liability to 
control misconduct that otherwise might not be covered. 293 
It has been fifteen years since Central Bank.  Stoneridge has worsened 
the problem at an inopportune time in economic history.  It is time for 
Congress to take back our financial markets and restore integrity and 
confidence. 
                                                     
 293. Kuehnle, supra note 30, at 376. 
